Rack::Request#POST
reads the entire request body into memory for Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
, calling rack.input.read(nil)
without enforcing a length or cap. Large request bodies can therefore be buffered completely into process memory before parsing, leading to denial of service (DoS) through memory exhaustion.
When handling non-multipart form submissions, Rack’s request parser performs:
form_vars = get_header(RACK_INPUT).read
Since read
is called with no argument, the entire request body is loaded into a Ruby String
. This occurs before query parameter parsing or enforcement of any params_limit
. As a result, Rack applications without an upstream body-size limit can experience unbounded memory allocation proportional to request size.
Attackers can send large application/x-www-form-urlencoded
bodies to consume process memory, causing slowdowns or termination by the operating system (OOM). The effect scales linearly with request size and concurrency. Even with parsing limits configured, the issue occurs before those limits are enforced.
query_parser.bytesize_limit
, preventing unbounded reads of application/x-www-form-urlencoded
bodies.client_max_body_size
, Apache LimitRequestBody
).{ "severity": "HIGH", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-400" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-10T17:33:35Z", "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-10T20:15:37Z" }