youki’s apparmor handling performs insufficiently strict write-target validation, which—combined with path substitution during pathname resolution—can allow writes to unintended procfs locations.
Weak write-target check
youki only verifies that the destination lies somewhere under procfs. As a result, a write intended for /proc/self/attr/apparmor/exec can succeed even if the path has been redirected to /proc/sys/kernel/hostname(which is also in procfs).
Path substitution While resolving a path component-by-component, a shared-mount race can substitute intermediate components and redirect the final target.
This is a different project, but the core logic is similar to the CVE in runc. Issues were identified in runc, and verification was also conducted in youki to confirm the problems. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering runc's original vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-363",
"CWE-61"
],
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-06T00:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-05T18:45:18Z"
}