The security of both a TUF client and repository implementations depend on the concept of trusted Metadata objects verifying the signatures over other Metadata that it delegates to. This verification process uses Targets.get_delegated_role(delegated_role: str)
to find the delegation information.
tuf.api.metadata.Targets.get_delegated_role()
should ensure that the given delegated_rolename
is actually a name of a role that is delegated by that Targets, but in the case of "succinct delegation" this does not happen.
tuf.ngclient
users are not impacted but direct users of tuf.api.metadata
could be impacted.
If an attacker can make a Metadata API user run Targets.get_delegated_role()
so that
1. the Targets
uses succinct delegation
1. the delegated_role
argument is not actually delegated by the Targets
the result will be incorrect.
This also means that if an attacker can make a Metadata API user run Targets.verify_delegate()
or Targets.get_verification_result()
so that
1. the delegating Targets
uses a succinct delegation
1. the delegated_role
argument is the name of some unrelated Metadata
1. that other Metadata is correctly signed by the keys defined in the succinct delegation
the result would be a successful verification even though the Targets
in question does not actually delegate to delegated_role
.
The impact is estimated to be low for following reasons:
tuf.api.metadata
in this way.All users of tuf.ngclient
are specifically not impacted. Users of tuf.api.metadata
could be impacted if they use succinct delegations in a way described above.
A fix is available in python-tuf 3.1.1 as commit 77cb66bc and in later releases as commit eb4834d9._
tuf.api.metadata
users should only call Targets.get_delegated_role()
, Targets.verify_delegate()
or Targets.get_verification_result()
with delegated_role
argument that is known to be delegated by the Targets
in question.
{ "nvd_published_at": null, "cwe_ids": [], "severity": "LOW", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-16T23:35:39Z" }