AZL-68525

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

futex: Prevent use-after-free during requeue-PI

syzbot managed to trigger the following race:

T1 T2

futex_wait_requeue_pi() futex_do_wait() schedule() futex_requeue() futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() futex_requeue_pi_prepare() requeue_pi_wake_futex() futex_requeue_pi_complete() /* preempt */

     * timeout/ signal wakes T1 *

futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() // Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED futex_hash_put() // back to userland, on stack futex_q is garbage

                                  /* back */
                                 wake_up_state(q->task, TASK_NORMAL);

In this scenario futex_wait_requeue_pi() is able to leave without using futex_q::lock_ptr for synchronization.

This can be prevented by reading futex_q::task before updating the futex_q::requeue_state. A reference on the task_struct is not needed because requeue_pi_wake_futex() is invoked with a spinlock_t held which implies a RCU read section.

Even if T1 terminates immediately after, the task_struct will remain valid during T2's wake_up_state(). A READ_ONCE on futex_q::task before futex_requeue_pi_complete() is enough because it ensures that the variable is read before the state is updated.

Read futex_q::task before updating the requeue state, use it for the following wakeup.