Import Source
https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-83633.json
JSON Data
https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/AZL-83633
Upstream
Published
2026-04-24T15:16:29Z
Modified
2026-08-28T17:47:52Z
Summary
CVE-2026-31555 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.134.1-2
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path

Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:

WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524

When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.

After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().

CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 futex_lock_pi(uaddr) // acquires the PI futex exit() futex_cleanup_begin() futex_state = EXITING; futex_lock_pi(uaddr) futex_lock_pi_atomic() attach_to_pi_owner() // observes EXITING *exiting = owner; // takes ref return -EBUSY wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner) put_task_struct(); // drops ref // exiting still points to owner goto retry; futex_lock_pi_atomic() lock_pi_update_atomic() cmpxchg(uaddr) *uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever // value changed return -EAGAIN; wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)

Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.

References

Affected packages

Azure Linux:3 / kernel

Package

Name
kernel
Purl
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
6.6.134.1-2

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-83633.json"