AZL-88455
See a problem?- Import Source
- https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-88455.json
- JSON Data
- https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/AZL-88455
- Upstream
- Published
- 2026-05-27T14:17:23Z
- Modified
- 2026-08-28T17:47:44Z
- Summary
- CVE-2026-46043 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1
- Details
-
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv
rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.
However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen:
payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE
This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.
Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.
- References