Import Source
https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-99633.json
JSON Data
https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/AZL-99633
Upstream
Published
2026-09-04T16:18:09Z
Modified
2026-09-23T14:17:43Z
Summary
CVE-2026-80819 affecting package kernel 6.6.152.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: RFCOMM: take rfcomm_mutex for the deferred setup accept

rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() completes a deferred setup by calling rfcomm_dlc_accept() without holding any RFCOMM lock:

if (test_and_clear_bit(RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP, &d->flags)) {
	rfcomm_dlc_accept(d);
	return 0;
}

and rfcomm_dlc_accept() dereferences the session on its first line:

struct sock *sk = d->session->sock->sk;

Every other path that touches d->session runs under rfcomm_mutex: rfcomm_dlc_open(), rfcomm_dlc_close(), rfcomm_dlc_exists(), rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(), and the RFCOMM thread through rfcomm_process_sessions(). rfcomm_connect_ind() is even documented as "called under rfcomm_lock()". This call site is the only one that skips it.

The RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP bit looks like it serialises the accept against teardown, since __rfcomm_dlc_close() returns early when it wins the test_and_clear. But rfcomm_recv_disc() forces the state first:

d->state = BT_CLOSED;
__rfcomm_dlc_close(d, err);

and the early return only covers BT_CONNECT, BT_CONFIG, BT_OPEN and BT_CONNECT2. With the state already BT_CLOSED that switch does not match, the bit is never consulted, and __rfcomm_dlc_close() falls through to rfcomm_dlc_unlink(), which sets d->session = NULL.

So a remote DISC on a deferred dlc clears the session while leaving RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP set. The next recvmsg() then passes the test_and_clear and dereferences a NULL session. No timing window is needed: once the DISC has been processed, the dereference is unconditional.

Give rfcomm_dlc_accept() the same shape as rfcomm_dlc_open() and rfcomm_dlc_close(): an exported wrapper that takes rfcomm_mutex and re-checks the session, around a __rfcomm_dlc_accept() that the two in-core callers, which already hold the mutex, keep using.

Reproduced on a KASAN + PROVE_LOCKING kernel with a BR/EDR peer emulated over /dev/vhci: the peer brings up an ACL link, opens L2CAP on the RFCOMM PSM, starts a session, opens a dlc on a channel bound with BT_DEFER_SETUP, and sends DISC after the socket is accepted. recv() on the accepted socket then hits:

Oops: general protection fault KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:rfcomm_dlc_accept+0x54/0x350 Call Trace: rfcomm_sock_recvmsg+0x1cd/0x230 sock_recvmsg+0x166/0x1c0 __sys_recvfrom+0x20d/0x300

0x10 is the offset of sock in struct rfcomm_session. With this patch the same run completes with recv() returning 0 and no report, and lockdep stays quiet, confirming rfcomm_mutex is still taken before lock_sock on this path as it is on the thread side.

References

Affected packages

Azure Linux:3 / kernel

Package

Name
kernel
Purl
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Last Affected
6.6.152.1-1

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-99633.json"