An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Access rights of Xenstore nodes are per domid. Unfortunately, existing granted access rights are not removed when a domain is being destroyed. This means that a new domain created with the same domid will inherit the access rights to Xenstore nodes from the previous domain(s) with the same domid. Because all Xenstore entries of a guest below /local/domain/<domid> are being deleted by Xen tools when a guest is destroyed, only Xenstore entries of other guests still running are affected. For example, a newly created guest domain might be able to read sensitive information that had belonged to a previously existing guest domain. Both Xenstore implementations (C and Ocaml) are vulnerable.
[
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.14.0"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "10.0"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "32"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "33"
}
]
}
]
"https://storage.googleapis.com/osv-test-cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2020-29481.json"