Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution.
In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest.
Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11.
1 Call newRecording.
2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it.
3 Call startRecording.
4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file.
The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.
{
"cna_assigner": "apache",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2022/41xxx/CVE-2022-41678.json",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"extracted_events": [
{
"fixed": "5.16.6"
},
{
"introduced": "5.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.17.4"
}
]
}
]
}{
"source": "CPE_RANGE",
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.16.6"
},
{
"introduced": "5.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.17.4"
}
]
}