CVE-2022-48853

Source
https://cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48853
Import Source
https://storage.googleapis.com/osv-test-cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2022-48853.json
JSON Data
https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/CVE-2022-48853
Downstream
Related
Published
2024-07-16T12:25:19.814Z
Modified
2026-03-20T12:21:56.833984Z
Summary
Reinstate some of "swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE""
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

swiotlb: fix info leak with DMAFROMDEVICE

The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering cve-2018-1000204.

A short description of what happens follows: 1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SGIO interface with: dxferlen == 524288, dxdferdir == SGDXFERFROMDEV and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR is not reading from the device. 2) In sgstartreq() the invocation of blkrqmap_user() effectively bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFPZERO in sgbuildindirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is allocated with GFPZERO. 3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a DMAFROMDEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device and the buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function virtqueueaddsplit() which uses DMAFROMDEVICE for the "in" sgs (here scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV). 4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all zeros. Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to the user-space buffer. 5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized, ain't all zeros and fails.

One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well behaved).

Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten, in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance impact of the extra bounce.

Database specific
{
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2022/48xxx/CVE-2022-48853.json",
    "cna_assigner": "Linux"
}
References

Affected packages

Git / git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git

Affected ranges

Type
GIT
Repo
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
Events
Introduced
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2
Fixed
fd97de9c7b973f46a6103f4170c5efc7b8ef8797
Fixed
aaf166f37eb6bb55d81c3e40a2a460c8875c8813
Fixed
06cb238b0f7ac1669cb06390704c61794724c191
Fixed
b2f140a9f980806f572d672e1780acea66b9a25c
Fixed
f3f2247ac31cb71d1f05f56536df5946c6652f4a
Fixed
7007c894631cf43041dcfa0da7142bbaa7eb673c
Fixed
dcead36b19d999d687cd9c99b7f37520d9102b57
Fixed
f2141881b530738777c28bb51c62175895c8178b
Fixed
901c7280ca0d5e2b4a8929fbe0bfb007ac2a6544

Database specific

source
"https://storage.googleapis.com/osv-test-cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2022-48853.json"