CVE-2022-49049

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret

When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the panic:

fd = memfd_secret();

ftruncate(fd, 10);
ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
strcpy(ptr, "123456789");

munmap(ptr, 10);
ftruncate(fd, 20);

The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down into simplesetattr, and then truncateinodepagesrange, and eventually we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to memset()).

For memfdsecret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the direct map (i.e. we call setdirectmapinvalidnoflush() on every fault). So the address returned by pageaddress() isn't useful, and when we try to memset() with it we panic.

This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL.

One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch.

[1]:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: errorcode(0x0002) - not-present page PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUGPAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memseterms+0x9/0x10 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8 RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028 RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028 R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0 R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8 FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? zerousersegments+0x82/0x190 truncateinodepartialfolio+0xd4/0x2a0 truncateinodepagesrange+0x380/0x830 truncatesetsize+0x63/0x80 simplesetattr+0x37/0x60 notifychange+0x3d8/0x4d0 dosysftruncate+0x162/0x1d0 _x64sysftruncate+0x1c/0x20 dosyscall64+0x44/0xa0 entrySYSCALL64afterhwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: xhcipci xhcihcd virtionet netfailover failover virtioblk virtioballoon uhcihcd ohcipci ohcihcd evdev ehcipci ehcihcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet CR2: ffffa0a889277028

[lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static] Signed-off-by: kernel test robot lkp@intel.com [axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL]