CVE-2023-53503

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: allow ext4getgroup_info() to fail

Previously, ext4getgroupinfo() would treat an invalid group number as BUG(), since in theory it should never happen. However, if a malicious attaker (or fuzzer) modifies the superblock via the block device while it is the file system is mounted, it is possible for sfirstdatablock to get set to a very large number. In that case, when calculating the block group of some block number (such as the starting block of a preallocation region), could result in an underflow and very large block group number. Then the BUGON check in ext4getgroupinfo() would fire, resutling in a denial of service attack that can be triggered by root or someone with write access to the block device.

For a quality of implementation perspective, it's best that even if the system administrator does something that they shouldn't, that it will not trigger a BUG. So instead of BUG'ing, ext4getgroupinfo() will call ext4error and return NULL. We also add fallback code in all of the callers of ext4getgroup_info() that it might NULL.

Also, since ext4getgroup_info() was already borderline to be an inline function, un-inline it. The results in a next reduction of the compiled text size of ext4 by roughly 2k.