CVE-2025-39989
- Source
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39989
- Import Source
- https://storage.googleapis.com/osv-test-cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2025-39989.json
- JSON Data
- https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/CVE-2025-39989
- Downstream
- Published
- 2025-04-18T07:01:39Z
- Modified
- 2025-10-18T08:23:42.084359Z
- Summary
- x86/mce: use is_copy_from_user() to determine copy-from-user context
- Details
-
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mce: use iscopyfrom_user() to determine copy-from-user context
Patch series "mm/hwpoison: Fix regressions in memory failure handling", v4.
1. What am I trying to do:
This patchset resolves two critical regressions related to memory failure handling that have appeared in the upstream kernel since version 5.17, as compared to 5.10 LTS.
- copyin case: poison found in user page while kernel copying from user space - instr case: poison found while instruction fetching in user space2. What is the expected outcome and why
- For copyin case:
Kernel can recover from poison found where kernel is doing getuser() or copyfromuser() if those places get an error return and the kernel return -EFAULT to the process instead of crashing. More specifily, MCE handler checks the fixup handler type to decide whether an in kernel #MC can be recovered. When EXTYPEUACCESS is found, the PC jumps to recovery code specified in _ASMEXTABLE_FAULT() and return a -EFAULT to user space.
- For instr case:
If a poison found while instruction fetching in user space, full recovery is possible. User process takes #PF, Linux allocates a new page and fills by reading from storage.
3. What actually happens and why
- For copyin case: kernel panic since v5.17
Commit 4c132d1d844a ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") introduced a new extable fixup type, EXTYPEEFAULTREG, and later patches updated the extable fixup type for copy-from-user operations, changing it from EXTYPEUACCESS to EXTYPEEFAULTREG. It breaks previous EXTYPEUACCESS handling when posion found in getuser() or copyfrom_user().
- For instr case: user process is killed by a SIGBUS signal due to #CMCI and #MCE race
When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when the data is about to be consumed.
Background: why UNcorrected errors tied to CMCI in Intel platform [1]
Prior to Icelake memory controllers reported patrol scrub events that detected a previously unseen uncorrected error in memory by signaling a broadcast machine check with an SRAO (Software Recoverable Action Optional) signature in the machine check bank. This was overkill because it's not an urgent problem that no core is on the verge of consuming that bad data. It's also found that multi SRAO UCE may cause nested MCE interrupts and finally become an IERR.
Hence, Intel downgrades the machine check bank signature of patrol scrub from SRAO to UCNA (Uncorrected, No Action required), and signal changed to
CMCI. Just to add to the confusion, Linux does take an action (in
ucdecodenotifier()) to try to offline the page despite the UCNA signature name.
Background: why #CMCI and #MCE race when poison is consuming in
Intel platform [1]Having decided that CMCI/UCNA is the best action for patrol scrub errors, the memory controller uses it for reads too. But the memory controller is executing asynchronously from the core, and can't tell the difference between a "real" read and a speculative read. So it will do CMCI/UCNA if an error is found in any read.
Thus:
1) Core is clever and thinks address A is needed soon, issues a speculative read.
2) Core finds it is going to use address A soon after sending the read request
3) The CMCI from the memory controller is in a race with MCE from the core that will soon try to retire the load from address A.
Quite often (because speculation has got better) the CMCI from the memory controller is delivered before the core is committed to the instruction reading address A, so the interrupt is taken, and Linux offlines the page (marking it as poison).
Why user process is killed for instr case
Commit 046545a661af ("mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not ---truncated---
- References
-
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b8388e97ba6a8c033f9a8b5565af41af07f9345
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a15bb8303b6b104e78028b6c68f76a0d4562134
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e3d8169c0950a0b3cd5105f6403a78350dcac80
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/449413da90a337f343cc5a73070cbd68e92e8a54
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5724654a084f701dc64b08d34a0e800f22f0e6e4
Affected packages
Git / git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
Affected ranges
- Type
- GIT
- Repo
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- Events
-
Introduced4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783Fixed5724654a084f701dc64b08d34a0e800f22f0e6e4
- Type
- GIT
- Repo
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- Events
-
Introduced4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783Fixed3e3d8169c0950a0b3cd5105f6403a78350dcac80
- Type
- GIT
- Repo
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- Events
-
Introduced4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783Fixed449413da90a337f343cc5a73070cbd68e92e8a54
- Type
- GIT
- Repo
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- Events
-
Introduced4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783Fixed0b8388e97ba6a8c033f9a8b5565af41af07f9345
- Type
- GIT
- Repo
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- Events
-
Introduced4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783Fixed1a15bb8303b6b104e78028b6c68f76a0d4562134
- Type
- GIT
- Repo
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- Events
-
Introduced0 Unknown introduced commit / All previous commits are affectedLast affected88eded8104d2ca0429703755dd250f8cbecc1447