In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler
The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digitalinrecvsddres() appends 3 or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the cascade tag in the SDDRES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the cascade-incomplete bit in the SELRES (deciding whether another round follows).
ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is sized accordingly (NFCNFCID1MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each round.
Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed the buffer.
Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays") fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/31xxx/CVE-2026-31622.json",
"cna_assigner": "Linux"
}