In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state
The legacy responder path in smprandom() currently labels the stored STK as authenticated whenever pendingseclevel is BTSECURITY_HIGH. That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing flow actually achieved.
For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMPFLAGMITM_AUTH stays clear and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result.
This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code, which already treats JUSTWORKS/JUSTCFM as unauthenticated.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/31xxx/CVE-2026-31773.json",
"cna_assigner": "Linux"
}