In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response
smpcmdpairingreq() currently builds the pairing response from the initiator authreq before enforcing the local BTSECURITYHIGH requirement. If the initiator omits SMPAUTHMITM, the response can also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM.
tkrequest() then sees an auth value without SMPAUTHMITM and may select JUSTCFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing policy the responder already enforces.
When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMPAUTHMITM in the response in both rsp.auth_req and auth. This keeps the responder auth bits and later method selection aligned.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/43xxx/CVE-2026-43334.json",
"cna_assigner": "Linux"
}