Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe allows unauthenticated denial of service via quadratic fragment-name uniqueness validation.
'Elixir.Absinthe.Phase.Document.Validation.UniqueFragmentNames':run/2 iterates over all fragments and for each one calls duplicate?/2, which evaluates Enum.count(fragments, &(&1.name == name)) — a full linear scan of the fragment list. The result is O(N²) comparisons per document, where N is the number of fragment definitions supplied by the caller.
Because input.fragments is built directly from the GraphQL query body, N is fully attacker-controlled. A minimum-size fragment definition is roughly 16 bytes, so a ~1 MB document carries ~60,000 fragments and forces ~3.6 × 10⁹ comparisons inside this single validation phase. No authentication, schema knowledge, or special configuration is required.
This issue affects absinthe: from 1.2.0 before 1.10.2.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/43xxx/CVE-2026-43967.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0b46e3bcc06c0d3797bacd64761b908a84646c1d"
},
{
"fixed": "223600c520493dcaf95080af552c413099f92c9d"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
],
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF"
}