Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body.
In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':maprequest/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?userid=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed.
This issue affects grpc from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48599.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "8aaf3d3a8c4c7b08ac65e9c6f254e0d24da1d048"
},
{
"fixed": "33b6a095dbc91c6dee3c7b90893d7d74952e82e4"
}
]
}
],
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF"
}