FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The log() function in src/juniperplugin/fastnetmonjuniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo date \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILELOGTMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inetntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with fileputcontents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.
{
"cna_assigner": "mitre",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48687.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.9"
},
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.2.9"
}
],
"source": [
"DESCRIPTION",
"CPE_RANGE"
],
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:pavel-odintsov:fastnetmon:*:*:*:*:community:*:*:*"
}