Deserialization of Untrusted Data and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerabilities in elixir-grpc grpc allow unauthenticated attackers to crash the BEAM node via atom table exhaustion and, when a decoded term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution on the server.
'Elixir.GRPC.Codec.Erlpack':decode/2 (lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex) calls :erlang.binarytoterm/1 on the raw gRPC message body without the :safe option, no size bound, and no type guard. Any unauthenticated peer that sends a request with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can send a crafted payload that mints arbitrary new atoms (which are never garbage-collected, exhausting the bounded atom table and crashing the VM) or that encodes a fun term which, if applied anywhere downstream, executes attacker-controlled code inside the server process.
This issue affects grpc from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-770"
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48853.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "25bcc569fe2cc4478531a6c546c923205fc751c9"
},
{
"fixed": "272a97a5ea1b46af1819f14a831fcf35fc91f992"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}