Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies.
Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decodebody/1 and Req.Steps.decompressbody/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decodebody/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erltar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erltar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompressbody/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound.
Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process.
This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/49xxx/CVE-2026-49755.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "e37753741cbdc725e6aba3d977b380163bfc0ecb"
},
{
"fixed": "84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}