CVE-2026-63964

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header

do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with

p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, ':');
while (p < eof) {
    s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, ':');
    ...
}

If the firmware image contains no ':' byte, strnchr() returns NULL. NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash.

The notsignedfw fallthrough earlier in doflash() and the chip-state branches in ccgfwupdateneeded() allow an unsigned blob to reach this loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops.

Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL.