XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the delimiters.
When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-91"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/66xxx/CVE-2026-66293.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
},
{
"fixed": "6d12ee12b9e32e86ef598b3f3cafccd1840b2f41"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "6d12ee12b9e32e86ef598b3f3cafccd1840b2f41"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}