Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) in esaml_binding in dropbox esaml allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust server memory and crash the Erlang VM via a crafted compressed SAMLResponse.
esaml_binding:decode_response/2 base64-decodes the attacker-supplied SAMLResponse, inflates it with zlib:unzip/1 with no bound on the output, then converts the result to a charlist with binary_to_list/1 before parsing. This runs on the SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints, which accept unauthenticated requests by design, and it runs before any signature check. A small deflate stream reaches a compression ratio near 1000 to 1, so a request body of tens of kilobytes inflates to hundreds of megabytes and then to several gigabytes of list heap, so a few requests exhaust memory and take the node down.
This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/93xxx/CVE-2026-93471.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
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{
"introduced": "deeb84378d5c82153b470e99d24f77c38afca14a"
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{
"fixed": "*"
},
{
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{
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{
"introduced": "0.1.0"
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{
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{
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{
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],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}
]
}