DEBIAN-CVE-2025-37816

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid countedby() use gcc 15 honors the _countedby(len) attribute on vsctppacket.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsctpxfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered: [ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 [ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/stringhelpers.c:1032 _fortifyreport+0x45/0x50 ... [ 80.843175] _fortifypanic+0x9/0xb [ 80.843186] vsctpxfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [meivschw] [ 80.843210] ? seqcountlockdepreaderaccess.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 80.843229] ? lockdephardirqson+0x7c/0x110 [ 80.843250] meivschwstart+0x98/0x120 [meivsc] [ 80.843270] meireset+0x11d/0x420 [mei] The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsctpxferhelper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsctppacket always use a buffer of VSCTPMAXXFERSIZE bytes for the packet. Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsctp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.