DEBIAN-CVE-2026-31415

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6datagramsend_ctl() Yiming Qian reported : <quote> I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via skb_under_panic() (local DoS). The core issue is a mismatch between: - a 16-bit length accumulator (struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen, type __u16) and - a pointer to the last provided destination-options header (opt->dst1opt) when multiple IPV6_DSTOPTS control messages (cmsgs) are provided. - include/net/ipv6.h: - struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen is __u16 (wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298) - net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl(): - Accepts repeated IPV6_DSTOPTS and accumulates into opt_flen without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933) - net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data(): - Uses opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen to compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465) - net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb(): - Calls ipv6_push_frag_opts() if opt->opt_flen is non-zero. (lines 1930-1934) - net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts() / ipv6_push_exthdr(): - Push size comes from ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt) (based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211) 1. opt_flen is a 16-bit accumulator: - include/net/ipv6.h:298 defines __u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */. 2. ip6_datagram_send_ctl() accepts repeated IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs and increments opt_flen each time: - In net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933, for IPV6_DSTOPTS: - It computes len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3); - It checks CAP_NET_RAW using ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW). (line 922) - Then it does: - opt->opt_flen += len; (line 927) - opt->dst1opt = hdr; (line 928) There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy IPV6_2292DSTOPTS path which rejects duplicates at net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904). If enough large IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs are provided, opt_flen wraps while dst1opt still points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header. In the attached PoC (poc.c): - 32 cmsgs with hdrlen=255 => len = (255+1)*8 = 2048 - 1 cmsg with hdrlen=0 => len = 8 - Total increment: 32*2048 + 8 = 65544, so (__u16)opt_flen == 8 - The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so dst1opt points to a 2048-byte header. 3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped opt_flen: - In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465: - headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...; With wrapped opt_flen, headersize/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later. 4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from dst1opt and is not limited by wrapped opt_flen: - In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934: - if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto); - In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211, ipv6_push_frag_opts() pushes dst1opt via ipv6_push_exthdr(). - In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184, ipv6_push_exthdr() does: - skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt)); - memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt)); With insufficient headroom, skb_push() underflows and triggers skb_under_panic() -> BUG(): - net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675 (skb_push() calls skb_under_panic()) - net/core/skbuff.c:207-214 (skb_panic() ends in BUG()) - The IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsg path requires CAP_NET_RAW in the target netns user namespace (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)). - Root (or any task with CAP_NET_RAW) can trigger this without user namespaces. - An unprivileged uid=1000 user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespaced CAP_NET_RAW (the attached PoC does this). - Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash). - ---truncated---