The vk-app backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the auth_key parameter was omitted.
Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as viewer_id, access_token, api_id, and api_result, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID.
The issue affects only applications using the vk-app backend.
The issue has been fixed by requiring auth_key to be present and valid before callback data is trusted.
Users should upgrade to a patched version.
Fix:
Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable the vk-app backend by removing social_core.backends.vk.VKAppOAuth2 from SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS.
There is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable backend.
Reported by @lalalala5678 through GitHub private vulnerability reporting.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:57:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T18:17:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}