GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m
Suggest an improvement- Source
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m
- Import Source
- https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/09/GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m/GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m.json
- JSON Data
- https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m
- Aliases
- Published
- 2026-09-17T20:43:16Z
- Modified
- 2026-09-17T21:00:05Z
- Severity
-
- 5.9 (Medium) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N CVSS Calculator
- 8.2 (High) CVSS_V4 - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N CVSS Calculator
- Summary
- Grav: Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in `plugin-asset-map.php` Static Asset Server (`index.php`)
- Details
-
Verified against:
getgrav/gravdevel branch,GRAV_VERSION = "2.0.15", file `index.phpTitle
Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in
plugin-asset-map.phpStatic Asset Server (index.php)Product / Affected Versions
- Product:
getgrav/grav - File:
index.php(top-level front controller, runs before Grav itself boots) - Confirmed present in: devel branch, 2.0.15
- Precondition: requires
user/config/plugin-asset-map.phpto exist and contain at least one route-prefix mapping ,this is an opt-in mechanism (per the code comment: "Fast static asset serving for plugins that bundle SPA apps"). No core mechanism generates this file automatically; it's created by a plugin that opts into this fast-path. Not reachable on a stock Grav install with no such plugin. Where reachable, it requires zero authentication.
CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') , specific mechanism: a path-prefix containment check performed with plain string comparison (
str_starts_with) instead of a directory-boundary-aware comparison, allowing escape into any sibling path whose name happens to extend the base directory's name as a string.Description
index.phpimplements a fast-path static file server that runs before Grav's own routing/security stack, gated on the presence of an asset-map file:$assetMapFile = __DIR__ . '/user/config/plugin-asset-map.php'; if (is_file($assetMapFile)) { $assetMap = require $assetMapFile; foreach ($assetMap as $routePrefix => $diskPath) { if (str_starts_with($path, $routePrefix)) { $relPath = substr($path, strlen($routePrefix)); $filePath = __DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/') . $relPath; $realFile = realpath($filePath); $realBase = realpath(__DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/')); if ($realFile && $realBase && str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase) && is_file($realFile)) { // ... serves $realFile directly, with Content-Type inferred from extension readfile($realFile); exit; } } } }realpath()correctly resolves..sequences, so a naive../../etc/passwd-style traversal that leaves the filesystem entirely is blocked (it wouldn't share the$realBasestring prefix). But the containment check itself,str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase), has no directory-boundary awareness it's a plain string-prefix test, not "is$realFileinside the$realBasedirectory." Any resolved path whose string representation merely begins with the same characters as$realBasepasses, including sibling directories that extend the base directory's name (assets→assets-secret,assets.bak,assets_old,assets2, etc.) a very common real-world directory-naming pattern (backup dirs, versioned dirs, disabled/legacy dirs sitting alongside the active one).Live Proof of Concept
Setup: the exact code block above, extracted verbatim from
index.php, executed with PHP 8.3.6 against a realistic directory layout (a plugin's activeassets/dir sitting next to an unrelatedassets-secret/dir containing a fake secret):user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js <- intended, public user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php <- NOT intended to be served user/config/plugin-asset-map.php: return ['/myplugin-assets' => 'user/plugins/myplugin/assets'];Legitimate request (
/myplugin-assets/app.js):realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js' realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets' >>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<< >>> Content: public asset contentTraversal request (
/myplugin-assets/../assets-secret/config.php):realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php' realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets' >>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<< >>> Content: SECRET_API_KEY=sk_live_totally_secret_12345str_starts_with('.../assets-secret/config.php', '.../assets')evaluatestruebecauseassets-secretliterally begins with the charactersassetsthere is no separator-boundary check (e.g. requiring$realBase . '/'as the actual prefix) to prevent this.Trust-boundary framing (per Grav's own SECURITY.md)
This code path requires no Grav account , it runs before Grav even initializes, directly off the raw request path. Per Grav's own stated criteria: "An unauthenticated attacker can achieve RCE, exfiltrate site data, or gain admin-equivalent control. No Grav account required" → this matches the CRITICAL bar exactly, for any deployment where the
plugin-asset-map.phpmechanism is in active use.Suggested Fix
Append a trailing directory separator before the prefix comparison, or use a proper containment check:
if ($realFile && $realBase && ( $realFile === $realBase || str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) ) && is_file($realFile)) {This is the standard fix for this exact bug class , ensuring the matched prefix ends exactly at a directory boundary, not partway through a longer sibling name.
- Product:
- Database specific
{ "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-22" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:43:16Z", "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "HIGH" }- References
Affected packages
Packagist / getgrav/grav
Package
- Name
- getgrav/grav
- Purl
- pkg:composer/getgrav/grav
Affected ranges
- Type
- ECOSYSTEM
- Events
-
Introduced0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affectedFixed2.0.15