A vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node.
In order to carry out the attack, the attacker establishes a peer connections to the victim, and sends a malicious GetBlockHeadersRequest
message with a count
of 0
, using the ETH
protocol.
In descendants := chain.GetHeadersFrom(num+count-1, count-1)
, the value of count-1
is passed to the function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64)
as parameter count
. Due to integer overflow, UINT64_MAX
value is then passed as the count
argument to function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64)
. This allows an attacker to bypass maxHeadersServe
and request all headers from the latest block back to the genesis block.
The fix has been included in geth version 1.13.15
and onwards.
The vulnerability was patched in: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/29534
No workarounds have been made public.
No more information is released at this time.
This issue was disclosed responsibly by DongHan Kim via the Ethereum bug bounty program. Thank you for your cooperation.
{ "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-06T15:15:23Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-400" ], "severity": "HIGH", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-06T14:20:40Z" }