An unauthenticated reflected XSS vulnerability exists in the dynamic icon API endpoint:
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIconWhen type=8, attacker-controlled content is embedded into SVG output without escaping. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and returns image/svg+xml, a crafted URL can inject executable SVG/HTML event handlers (for example onerror) and run JavaScript in the SiYuan web origin.
This can be chained to perform authenticated API actions and exfiltrate sensitive data when a logged-in user opens the malicious link.
The issue is caused by unsafe output construction and incomplete sanitization:
Endpoint is exposed without auth middleware
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon is registered in the unauthenticated section.User input is inserted into SVG via string formatting
generateTypeEightSVG, %s directly injects content into <text>...</text> without XML/HTML escaping.Sanitizer only removes <script> tags
RemoveScriptsInSVG removes <script> nodes, but does not remove dangerous attributes (onerror, onload, etc.) or unsafe elements.As a result, payloads such as </text><image ... onerror=...><text> survive and execute.
Open this URL in a browser:
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=%3C%2Ftext%3E%3Cimage%20href%3Dx%20onerror%3Dalert(document.domain)%3E%3C%2Fimage%3E%3Ctext%3E
Example full URL:
http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=%3C%2Ftext%3E%3Cimage%20href%3Dx%20onerror%3Dalert(document.domain)%3E%3C%2Fimage%3E%3Ctext%3E
Expected result:
alert(document.domain)), confirming reflected XSS.If a victim is authenticated in the same browser session, JavaScript running in origin can call privileged APIs and exfiltrate returned data.
This is a reflected XSS in an unauthenticated endpoint, with realistic account/data compromise impact:
{
"severity": "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T21:45:10Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
]
}