An issue in the @angular/core package allows bypassing script-execution restrictions during dynamic component creation.
Specifically, the dynamic component instantiation mechanism (createComponent) failed to reject mounting components directly onto a <script> or namespaced script element (such as <svg:script>). This enabled the initialization of custom components on a tag that executes scripts, allowing attackers to hijack or inject script-executing hosts.
This flaw enables an attacker who can control the host element or selector parameter passed to createComponent to initialize or mount an Angular component directly onto a <script> tag, leading to execution of untrusted code or client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
Any Angular application that registers dynamic components based on user-supplied parameters (like selectors or host elements) is vulnerable to this security bypass.
Once exploited, this allows a malicious actor to mount a dynamic component on a script tag, bypassing core dynamic component creation safeguards to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the target user's browser context. This could lead to session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.
To successfully exploit these vulnerabilities, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist:
createComponent.{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T16:51:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T16:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}