GHSA-6jqj-f58p-mrw3

Source

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6jqj-f58p-mrw3

Import Source

https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2021/12/GHSA-6jqj-f58p-mrw3/GHSA-6jqj-f58p-mrw3.json

JSON Data

https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-6jqj-f58p-mrw3

Aliases

Related

CVE-2020-15091

Published

2021-12-20T18:17:33Z

Modified

2024-05-31T17:46:56Z

Severity

6.5 (Medium) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H CVSS Calculator

Summary

Denial of Service in TenderMint

Details

Description

Denial of Service

Tendermint 0.33.0 and above allow block proposers to include signatures for the wrong block. This may happen naturally if you start a network, have it run for some time and restart it without changing the chainID. (It is a misconfiguration to reuse chainIDs.) Correct block proposers will accidentally include signatures for the wrong block if they see these signatures, and then commits won't validate, making all proposed blocks invalid. A malicious validator (even with a minimal amount of stake) can use this vulnerability to completely halt the network.

Tendermint 0.33.6 checks all the signatures are for the block with +2/3 majority before creating a commit.

False Witness

Tendermint 0.33.1 and above are no longer fully verifying commit signatures during block execution - they stop after +2/3. This means proposers can propose blocks that contain valid +2/3 signatures and then the rest of the signatures can be whatever they want. They can claim that all the other validators signed just by including a CommitSig with arbitrary signature data. While this doesn't seem to impact safety of Tendermint per se, it means that Commits may contain a lot of invalid data **.

** This was already true of blocks, since they could include invalid txs filled with garbage, but in that case the application knew that they are invalid and could punish the proposer. But since applications didn't--and don't-- verify commit signatures directly (they trust Tendermint to do that), they won't be able to detect it.

This can impact incentivization logic in the application that depends on the LastCommitInfo sent in BeginBlock, which includes which validators signed. For instance, Gaia incentivizes proposers with a bonus for including more than +2/3 of the signatures. But a proposer can now claim that bonus just by including arbitrary data for the final -1/3 of validators without actually waiting for their signatures. There may be other tricks that can be played because of this.

Tendermint 0.33.6 verifies all the signatures during block execution *.

*** Please note that the light client does not check nil votes and exits as soon as 2/3+ of the signatures are checked.

Impact

All nodes
The network stops due to having a commit with a wrong signature.

Patches

v0.33.6 andn v0.34.0-dev1.0.20200702134149-480b995a3172

Workarounds

No workarounds.

References

https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/4926

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in tendermint/tendermint * Email us at security@tendermint.com

More information can be found here.

Database specific

{
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-347"
    ],
    "severity": "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-24T20:49:56Z"
}

References

Affected packages

Go / github.com/tendermint/tendermint

Package

Name: github.com/tendermint/tendermint; View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl: pkg:golang/github.com/tendermint/tendermint

Affected ranges

Type: SEMVER
Events: Introduced

0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected

Fixed

0.33.6