GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x.json
JSON Data
https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x
Aliases
Downstream
MINI (2)
Published
2026-04-15T19:21:06Z
Modified
2026-09-25T14:25:38Z
Severity
  • 9.1 (Critical) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing
Details

Impact

A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.

Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:

  • OAuth2 Proxy is configured with --reverse-proxy
  • and at least one rule is defined with --skip_auth_routes or the legacy --skip-auth-regex

OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when --reverse-proxy is enabled and --skip-auth-route or --skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.

This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.

Patches

This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced --trusted-proxy-ip flag in v7.15.2. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will continue to trust ALL source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send X-Forwarded-* headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.

Mitigation

  • Strip any client-provided X-Forwarded-Uri header at the reverse proxy or load balancer level

  • Explicitly overwrite X-Forwarded-Uri with the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy

    Example nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:

      location /internal-auth/ {
        internal; # Ensure external users can't access this path
    
        # Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from.
        proxy_set_header Host       $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP  $remote_addr;
        # set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
    
        proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/;
      }
    
  • Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy

  • Remove or narrow --skip-auth-route / --skip-auth-regex rules where possible

Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-290"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-15T19:21:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T00:16:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
}
References

Affected packages

Go / github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

Package

Name
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:golang/github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
7.5.0
Fixed
7.15.2

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x.json"