The target search endpoint (POST /api/latest/fleet/targets) returned team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers; the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization.
An authenticated user with Observer, Observer+, or Technician role (global or team-scoped) could retrieve unmasked team enroll secrets and team agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query.
With a leaked team enroll secret, an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team. If the team's agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were also exposed.
If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should:
Fleet thanks @fuzzztf for responsibly reporting this issue.
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
Send an email to security@fleetdm.com Join #fleet in osquery Slack
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-12T15:18:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
}