An issue in the @angular/compiler and @angular/core packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.
Specifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., <svg:script> or <:svg:script>) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.
Furthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.
Combined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
Any Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.
Once exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribute bindings, bypassing core sanitization constraints to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the target user's browser context. This could lead to session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.
To successfully exploit these vulnerabilities, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist:
<svg:script>) to evade standard tag-name blocklists/checks.{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:21:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T16:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}