A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in CoreDNS's loop detection plugin that allows an attacker to crash the DNS server by sending specially crafted DNS queries. The vulnerability stems from the use of a predictable pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for generating a secret query name, combined with a fatal error handler that terminates the entire process.
The CoreDNS loop plugin is designed to detect forwarding loops by performing a self-test during server startup. The plugin generates a random query name (qname) using Go's math/rand package and sends an HINFO query to itself. If the server receives multiple matching queries, it assumes a forwarding loop exists and terminates.
The vulnerability arises from two design flaws:
Predictable PRNG Seed: The random number generator is seeded with time.Now().UnixNano(), making the generated qname predictable if an attacker knows the approximate server start time.
Fatal Error Handler: When the plugin detects what it believes is a loop (3+ matching HINFO queries), it calls log.Fatalf() which invokes os.Exit(1), immediately terminating the process without cleanup or recovery.
File: plugin/loop/setup.go
// PRNG seeded with predictable timestamp
var r = rand.New(time.Now().UnixNano())
// Qname generation using two consecutive PRNG calls
func qname(zone string) string {
l1 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
l2 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
return dnsutil.Join(l1, l2, zone)
}
File: plugin/loop/loop.go
func (l *Loop) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
// ... validation checks ...
if state.Name() == l.qname {
l.inc() // Increment counter
}
if l.seen() > 2 {
// FATAL: Terminates entire process
log.Fatalf("Loop (%s -> %s) detected for zone %q...", ...)
}
// ...
}
File: plugin/pkg/log/log.go
func Fatalf(format string, v ...any) {
logf(fatal, format, v...)
os.Exit(1) // Immediate process termination
}
The loop plugin remains active during the following conditions:
| Condition | Window Duration | Attack Feasibility |
|---|---|---|
| Healthy startup | 2 seconds | Requires precise timing |
| Self-test failure (upstream unreachable) | 30 seconds | HIGH - Extended window |
| Network degradation | Variable | Depends on retry behavior |
Primary Attack Vector: Network Degradation
When the upstream DNS server is unreachable (network partition, misconfiguration, outage), the loop plugin's self-test fails repeatedly. During this period:
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ATTACK TIMELINE │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ T+0s CoreDNS starts, PRNG seeded with UnixNano() │
│ T+0.5s Self-test HINFO query sent (visible in logs) │
│ T+2s Self-test fails (upstream timeout) │
│ T+3s Retry #1 - counter resets, qname unchanged │
│ T+5s Retry #2 - attacker observes qname in logs │
│ T+5.1s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #1 → counter = 1 │
│ T+5.2s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #2 → counter = 2 │
│ T+5.3s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #3 → counter = 3 → os.Exit(1) │
│ T+5.3s SERVER CRASHES │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
| Requirement | Notes |
|---|---|
| Network Access | Must be able to send UDP packets to CoreDNS port |
| Log Access | Required to observe the qname (common in shared clusters) |
| Timing | Extended window during network degradation |
| Authentication | None required |
CoreDNS is the default DNS server for Kubernetes clusters. A successful attack would:
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-337"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-06T22:08:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T16:16:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}