Improper validation of the JWT NumericDate claims exp, nbf, and iat in hono/utils/jwt allows tokens with non-spec-compliant claim values to silently bypass time-based checks. This issue is not exploitable by an anonymous attacker; it only manifests when a malformed claim value reaches verify() — typically when the application itself issues such tokens, or when the signing key is otherwise under attacker control.
The validation routine combined option, presence, and threshold checks in a single short-circuiting expression, so several classes of malformed values were silently skipped instead of rejected:
This deviates from RFC 7519 §4.1.4, which defines NumericDate as a finite JSON numeric value.
An actor able to issue tokens accepted by the application may craft tokens whose exp, nbf, or iat claims silently bypass time-based enforcement. This may lead to:
exp configured on the verifier.nbf accepted as currently valid.iat accepted as legitimately issued.Deployments using a well-formed token issuer and protecting the signing key are not affected.
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:16:57Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"severity": "LOW",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1284"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-09T00:45:19Z"
}