GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp

Suggest an improvement
Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp/GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp.json
JSON Data
https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp
Aliases
  • CVE-2026-40346
Published
2026-04-15T19:43:50Z
Modified
2026-04-15T19:48:57.984247Z
Severity
  • 6.4 (Medium) CVSS_V4 - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
NocoBase has SSRF in Workflow HTTP Request and Custom Request Plugins
Details

Summary

NocoBase's workflow HTTP request plugin and custom request action plugin make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs without any SSRF protection. An authenticated user can access internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost.

Vulnerable Code

1. Workflow HTTP Request Plugin

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-workflow-request/src/server/RequestInstruction.ts lines 117-128:

return axios.request({
  url: trim(url),  // User-controlled, no validation
  method,
  headers,
  params,
  timeout,
  ...(method.toLowerCase() !== 'get' && data != null
    ? { data: transformer ? await transformer(data) : data }
    : {}),
});

The url at line 98 comes directly from user workflow configuration with only whitespace trimming.

2. Custom Request Action Plugin

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/actions/send.ts lines 172-198:

const axiosRequestConfig = {
  baseURL: ctx.origin,
  ...options,
  url: getParsedValue(url, variables),  // User-controlled via template
  headers: { ... },
  params: getParsedValue(arrayToObject(params), variables),
  data: getParsedValue(toJSON(data), variables),
};
const res = await axios(axiosRequestConfig);  // No IP validation

Missing Protections

  • No request-filtering-agent or SSRF library (confirmed via grep across entire codebase)
  • No private IP range filtering
  • No cloud metadata endpoint blocking
  • No URL scheme validation
  • No DNS rebinding protection

Attack Scenario

  1. Authenticated user creates a workflow with HTTP Request node
  2. Sets URL to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
  3. Triggers the workflow
  4. Server fetches AWS metadata and returns IAM credentials in workflow execution logs

Alternatively via Custom Request action: 1. Create custom request with URL http://127.0.0.1:5432 or http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin 2. Execute the action 3. Server makes request to internal service

Impact

  • Cloud metadata theft: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials via metadata endpoints
  • Internal network access: Scan and interact with services on private IP ranges
  • Database access: Connect to localhost databases (PostgreSQL, Redis, etc.)
  • Authentication required: Yes (authenticated user), but any workspace member can create workflows
Database specific
{
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-15T19:43:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed": true
}
References

Affected packages

npm / @nocobase/plugin-workflow-request

Package

Name
@nocobase/plugin-workflow-request
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:npm/%40nocobase/plugin-workflow-request

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
2.0.37

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp/GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp.json"