A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in ruby-saml even with the messagemaxbytesize setting configured. The vulnerability occurs because the SAML response is validated for Base64 format prior to checking the message size, leading to potential resource exhaustion.
ruby-saml
includes a message_max_bytesize
setting intended to prevent DOS attacks and decompression bombs. However, this protection is ineffective in some cases due to the order of operations in the code:
https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/blob/fbbedc978300deb9355a8e505849666974ef2e67/lib/onelogin/ruby-saml/saml_message.rb
def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)
return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) # <--- Issue here. Should be moved after next code block.
settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?
if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize
raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected")
end
decoded = decode(saml)
...
end
The vulnerability is in the execution order. Prior to checking bytesize the base64_encoded?
function performs regex matching on the entire input string:
!!string.gsub(/[\r\n]|\\r|\\n|\s/, "").match(BASE64_FORMAT)
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
When successfully exploited, this vulnerability can lead to:
All applications using ruby-saml
with SAML configured and enabled are vulnerable.
Reorder the validation steps to ensure max bytesize is checked first
def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)
settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?
if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize
raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected")
end
return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml)
decoded = decode(saml)
...
end
{ "github_reviewed": true, "severity": "MODERATE", "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-30T13:20:05Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-400" ], "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-30T14:15:29Z" }