Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either
set
a new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of the contrast
CLI) orverify
the coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.Under these circumstances, the attacker can:
This issue does not affect the following:
This issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.
The issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.
set
call, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator.set
or verify
calls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.{ "nvd_published_at": null, "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-05T21:30:35Z", "severity": "HIGH", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-285" ] }