cx() in hono/css composes class names from plain strings but marks the result as already-escaped without HTML-escaping the input. When the result is used as a JSX class attribute during server-side rendering, the value is written into the attribute unescaped, so untrusted input can break out of the class attribute and inject arbitrary markup, leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
Because the composed value is treated as pre-escaped, the HTML attribute escaping normally applied to interpolated values is skipped, and characters such as " pass through unescaped — allowing a value to terminate the attribute and add further attributes or elements. This arises when an application passes untrusted, user-controlled input as a class name to cx(), for example when merging a base class with an externally provided className.
During server-side rendering, an attacker who controls a value passed to cx() can inject arbitrary HTML into the page, resulting in stored or reflected XSS in the victim's browser.
This may lead to:
Applications are affected only if they render JSX server-side and pass untrusted input as a class name to cx().
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T18:33:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T17:17:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}