OESA-2021-1161

Source
https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161
Import Source
https://repo.openeuler.org/security/data/osv/OESA-2021-1161.json
JSON Data
https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/OESA-2021-1161
Upstream
Published
2021-05-06T11:02:51Z
Modified
2025-08-12T05:07:11.361033Z
Summary
netty security update
Details

Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. %package help Summary: Documents for %{name} Buildarch: noarch Requires: man info Provides: %{name}-javadoc = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: %{name}-javadoc < %{version}-%{release} %description help Man pages and other related documents for %{name}.

Security Fix(es):

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by Http2MultiplexHandler as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest, HttpContent, etc.) via Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodecand then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is True: HTTP2MultiplexCodec or Http2FrameCodec is used, Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom ChannelInboundHandler that is put in the ChannelPipeline behind Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec.(CVE-2021-21295)

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to True. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.(CVE-2021-21409)

Database specific
{
    "severity": "Medium"
}
References

Affected packages

openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1 / netty

Package

Name
netty
Purl
pkg:rpm/openEuler/netty&distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
4.1.13-11.oe1

Ecosystem specific

{
    "src": [
        "netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.src.rpm"
    ],
    "noarch": [
        "netty-help-4.1.13-11.oe1.noarch.rpm"
    ],
    "x86_64": [
        "netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.x86_64.rpm"
    ],
    "aarch64": [
        "netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.aarch64.rpm"
    ]
}