OESA-2024-1867

pip is the package installer for Python. You can use pip to install packages from the Python Package Index and other indexes. %global bashcompdir %(b=$(pkg-config --variable=completionsdir bash-completion 2>/dev/null); echo ${b:-/bash_completion.d}) Name: python-pip Version: 20.2.2 Release: 4 Summary: A tool for installing and managing Python packages License: MIT and Python and ASL 2.0 and BSD and ISC and LGPLv2 and MPLv2.0 and (ASL 2.0 or BSD) URL: http://www.pip-installer.org Source0: https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/p/pip/pip-.tar.gz BuildArch: noarch Patch1: allow-stripping-given-prefix-from-wheel-RECORD-files. Patch2: emit-a-warning-when-running-with-root-privileges.patch Patch3: remove-existing-dist-only-if-path-conflicts.patch Patch6000: dummy-certifi.patch Patch6001: backport-CVE-2021-3572.patch

Security Fix(es):

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 doesn't treat the Cookie HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a Cookie header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly. This issue has been patched in urllib3 version 1.26.17 or 2.0.5.(CVE-2023-43804)

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 301, 302, or 303 after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like POST) to GET as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although this behavior is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers. Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable. Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability: 1. Using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON) and 2. The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 301, 302, or 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised. This issue has been addressed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7 and users are advised to update to resolve this issue. Users unable to update should disable redirects for services that aren't expecting to respond with redirects with redirects=False and disable automatic redirects with redirects=False and handle 301, 302, and 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body. (CVE-2023-45803)

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. When using urllib3's proxy support with ProxyManager, the Proxy-Authorization header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected. However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the Proxy-Authorization header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the Proxy-Authorization HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects. Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident. Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Proxy-Authorization header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach. We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited: 1. Setting the Proxy-Authorization header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support. 2. Not disabling HTTP redirects. 3. Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin. Users are advised to update to either version 1.26.19 or version 2.2.2. Users unable to upgrade may use the Proxy-Authorization header with urllib3's ProxyManager, disable HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests, or not user the Proxy-Authorization header as mitigations.(CVE-2024-37891)