RUSTSEC-2026-0187

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0187
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0187.json
JSON Data
https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2026-0187
Published
2026-06-21T12:00:00Z
Modified
2026-06-26T10:00:04.782128420Z
Severity
  • 7.5 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H CVSS Calculator
Summary
Stack overflow in lopdf via deeply nested PDF objects
Details

lopdf::Document::load_mem (and the other load* entry points) parses nested PDF arrays and dictionaries with unbounded recursion. A small crafted PDF whose Catalog contains a deeply nested array (/X [[[ … ]]], on the order of 10,000 levels) exhausts the call stack and aborts the process with SIGABRT.

Because this is a stack-overflow abort rather than a panic!, it cannot be caught with catch_unwind: any service that parses untrusted PDF input with lopdf can be crashed by a ~21 KB file, resulting in a denial of service.

Confirmed on lopdf 0.41.0 and earlier; fixed in 0.42.0. Default configuration, no features changed.

Proof of concept

fn main() {
    let bytes = std::fs::read("poc.pdf").unwrap(); // ~10,380-deep nested array in the Catalog
    let _ = lopdf::Document::load_mem(&bytes);     // stack overflow -> SIGABRT
}

An equivalent PoC is a minimal PDF whose Catalog /X value is "[" * 10380 + "]" * 10380.

Suggested fix

Enforce a maximum object-nesting depth in the parser and return an Err instead of recursing without bound.

Database specific
{
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / lopdf

Package

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
0.42.0

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "functions": [],
        "os": [],
        "arch": []
    }
}

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0187.json"
cvss
"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
informational
null
categories
[
    "denial-of-service"
]