AZL-83876
See a problem?- Import Source
- https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-83876.json
- JSON Data
- https://api.test.osv.dev/v1/vulns/AZL-83876
- Upstream
- Published
- 2026-04-24T15:16:41Z
- Modified
- 2026-08-28T17:47:52Z
- Summary
- CVE-2026-31622 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.137.1-1
- Details
-
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler
The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3 or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round follows).
ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each round.
Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed the buffer.
Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays") fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.
- References